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Abstract
Reform opponents often argue that benecial reforms should be rejected,
just in case implementation leads the polity down the slippery slope (of
implementing additional reforms) that ends at an outcome that is worse
than the status quo. What rationalizes this fear of policy overshooting its target? In the context of public goods provision, I explain the
slippery slope sentiment as the consequence of manipulation by some
informed voters, of the beliefs of misinformed voters who systematically
undervalue the public good. Ineciently under-providing the public
good reduces the opportunities for the misinformed to learn the true
value of the good, which suppresses aggregate demand for the good.
This incentive to distort is larger when the income of the pivotal voter
is further from the median income, and exists even when the number of
misinformed are small. Using an inequality measure that is analogous
to, but distinct from, Lorenz dominance, I show that slippery slope
ineciencies are more likely to arise when inequality increases.
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Introduction
Once we let go of the exclusivity of a one man-one woman relationship with procreation linking the generations, then why stop
there? If it is `about love and commitment' then it is entirely logical to extend marriage to, say, two sisters bringing up children
together. If it is merely `about love and commitment' then there is
nothing illogical about multiple relationships, such as two women
and one man.  Lord Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury

So argued Lord Carey (2013) against same-sex marriage, invoking the fear that
embracing marriage equality would be the rst step down the

slippery slope

to celebrating incestuous or polyamorous relationships. In an earlier debate,
Justice Antonin Scalia and other conservatives argued against extending many
civil rights and protections to gays and lesbians that were enjoyed by hetero-
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sexuals , on the basis that doing so would be the rst step towards legalizing
same-sex marriage  even though there was little popular support for marriage equality at the time.

Both cases are examples of arguments against a

proposed policy  not because the policy is itself objectionable, but because
of the objectionable additional reforms that would likely follow due to the
policy's implementation.
Anti-reform arguments of this sort are commonplace in political discourse.
And, although slippery-slope arguments are by their nature `anti-reform', they
are not unique to conservatives. For example, liberals in societies with universal healthcare often argue against limited privatization initiatives as the
rst step along the slippery slope towards dismantling the welfare state. In
Canada, for example, there is much opposition to the evolution of a two-tiered
healthcare system in which people can choose to pay for private alternatives.

1 For example, in

Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Justice Scalia wrote in a minor-

ity opinion that gay men ought to not enjoy the right to engage in consensual intercourse in
the privacy of their homes. The opinion argues at 600: That review is readily satised here
by the same rational basis...that certain forms of sexual behavior are `immoral and unacceptable,'... This is the same justication that supports many other laws regulating sexual
behavior that make a distinction based upon the identity of the partner-for example, laws
against adultery, fornication, and adult incest, and laws refusing to recognize homosexual
marriage.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346980

Indeed, until a 2005 Supreme Court decision ruled such laws illegal, six of
Canada's ten provinces had bans on individuals using private insurance to
access services that were generally available through the public system.
Whilst the contexts dier, the arguments share a common feature.

Reform

opponents hold that society should reject otherwise benecial or eciencyenhancing policies or reforms, just in case those reforms push society down a

slippery slope

that ends in policies that are much worse than the status quo.

The argument is puzzling in at least the following sense: it assumes that reforms generate momentum.

Once a primary reform that enacts a desirable

policy is implemented, successive reforms will inevitably follow, causing policy
to over-shoot its target.

But surely Congress (or the appropriate decision-

making body) must approve those successive reforms as well?

Presumably,

Congress may reject further reforms if they are indeed undesirable or inecient.
This paper explains the slippery slope sentiment in the context of a polity
where some agents are misinformed about the value of proposed policies or
reforms, but may come to learn of their value through acquaintance.

As I

will demonstrate, under majority rule, a partially informed polity will choose
dierently from a perfectly informed one  even if a large majority of the
polity are correctly informed. This creates an incentive for agents who dislike
the expected policy outcomes when the polity is perfectly informed (i.e. the
outcome at the end of the slippery slope) to not implement the initial policy
or reform, and thereby prevent learning. In eect, the identity of the future
decision maker (pivotal voter) is endogenous to the current policy choice. The
current decision maker has an incentive to ineciently maintain the status quo
in order to retain control of the agenda.
That voters learn by acquaintance is plainly evident. History is replete with
examples of policies that voters were originally suspicious or skeptical about,
but eventually came to appreciate.

Social Security, which is now extremely

popular amongst voters, was, at its inception, feared by many as a socialist
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scourge that would enslave Americans.
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In a dierent context, recent work

by Baccini and Leemann (2012) shows that voters are more likely to be sensitive to climate issues when voting after being exposed to a natural disaster.
Social science research suggests a similar eect regarding attitudes towards
gays and lesbians.

Herek and Glunt (1993) and Herek et al. (1996) show

that interpersonal contact was the strongest predictor of positive attitudes
towards homosexuals. And, of course, public policy aects the opportunities
for learning by acquaintance to occur. Day and Schoenrade (1997), Day and
Schoenrade (2000), and Grith and Hebl (2002), amongst others, demonstrate
that individuals are more likely to be open about their sexuality (and thereby
enable known interpersonal contact between homosexuals and heterosexuals)
in environments where anti-discrimination laws and policies are present.

3

The idea that voters are often mistaken about the value of reforms or public
goods is also plainly evident. In a survey of 1021 individuals, Koch and Mettler
(2012) found that over 50% of respondents receiving government benets were
unaware that those benets were indeed provided by the government.

4

This

2 A Republican congressman from New York claimed: The lash of the dictator will
be felt, and 25 million free American citizens will for the rst time submit themselves
to a ngerprint test.

Another opponent worried that it would establish a bureaucracy

in the eld of insurance in competition with private business that would destroy private
pensions.

Unsurprisingly, slippery slope concerns formed part of the objection to Social

Security. During hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, a senator from Oklahoma
asked Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, Isn't this socialism?. When she answered no,
he responded: Isn't this a teeny-weeny bit of socialism? Altman (2005)

3 Indeed, as this article is being written, Congress is debating a federal Employment

Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) to protect homosexual and transgendered people from
discrimination in the workplace. That there is considerable opposition to the bill is perfectly
consistent with this paper's thesis that politicians will reject desirable reforms  does anyone
genuinely favor arbitrary discrimination in the workplace?  due to slippery slope concerns.
Anti-discrimination protections that allow homosexuals to become more visible may result
in co-workers favorably amending their attitudes towards homosexuals, and by consequence,
supporting social policies that are more inclusive of homosexuals, such as marriage equality.

4 In their study, Koch and Mettler rst asked respondents if they had ever used a govern-

ment social program or not. Only 43% responded armatively. Respondents were then read
a list of 21 government programs, and then asked if their response would change. After hearing the list, 96% of respondents admitted to having beneted from government programs.
The study relied purely upon self reporting. Amongst respondents who originally claimed
to have not beneted from government programs, 60% later admitted to having claimed the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 47% had claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit, 44%
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perceived absence of government in their lives suggests that agents will be
more skeptical of the value of public spending than they would ideally, if they
were correctly informed.

Conversely, when government spending is seen to

be wasteful or directed towards ends that do not directly improve the public
welfare, voters tend to inate the cost of such programs.

U.S. spending on

foreign aid provides a stark example. In a 2010 World Public Opinion Poll of
848 Americans, the median respondent believed that the foreign aid budget
accounted for 25% of the federal spending, whilst only 19% believed it was
below 5%.

The median respondent believed that foreign aid should ideally

comprise 10% of federal spending.

5

In fact, the foreign aid budget in 2010

6

was less than 1% of total federal spending.

By over-attributing the share

of public spending on `non-benecial' projects, voters eectively undervalue
public spending as an aggregate bundle. This is especially true if voters underestimate the positive externalities associated with foreign aid.
To give context to the analysis, I consider a stylized model that focuses on
the provision of a public good that has an objective marginal benet, but
which some agents undervalue.

I refer to the latter agents as misinformed.

Agents in the economy are distinguished by their income, and the public good
is nanced by a proportional tax on income. These assumptions imply that
informed agents with higher incomes will demand lower levels of public goods
provision  even though they value the public good identically to informed
agents with lower incomes  because they are liable to nance a greater share
of the public good.

The assumptions also imply that at each income level,

misinformed agents demand less of the public good than their informed counterparts. Combining these results, each misinformed voter can be associated

accessed Social Security, 43% beneted from Pell Grants, 40% were on Medicare, 28% were
on Medicaid, and 25% received Food Stamps.

5 The mean responses were even larger - the average respondent believed that foreign aid

comprised 27% of federal spending, but should only be 13%.

6 A 2000 poll by the same group found that 61% of respondents believed the foreign aid

budget was too large. (In that survey, the median estimate of the foreign aid budget was
10% of total federal spending.) When asked to imagine that the federal government actually
spent 1% of its budget on foreign aid - which was actually the case - only 13% still claimed
that this amount was too large.
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(in principle) with a wealthier correctly informed voter with the same preferences over public policy. Misinformed agents express preferences as if they
were informed and richer than they actually are. Observing the system from
without, the partially informed polity appears to behave in the same way that
a much richer fully informed polity would.

In particular, since misinformed

agents behave as if they are richer than they actually are, the income of the
pivotal voter will be larger than the true median income.
The possibility of learning introduces an additional dynamic. To make things
stark, suppose all misinformed voters perfectly learn the value of the public
good if a positive quantity is provided. Following any period in which there
is positive provision of the public good, all the misinformed voters will learn
the truth, and demand a larger level of the public good in the future. This
changes the identity of the pivotal voter.

By choosing his ideal (positive)

level of the public good, the pivotal voter in the partially-informed economy
(whose income will be above the true median income) will cede political power
to the true median income earner, causing future public goods provision to
increase.

If this increase is indeed large enough, the old pivotal voter may

prefer to prevent learning by not providing the public good at all.

By en-

trenching the inecient status quo, the pivotal voter can prevent learning by
the misinformed, and accordingly, retain control of the agenda. The decision
maker is willing to tolerate short run ineciencies to prevent sustained long
run ineciencies that, from her perspective, are much worse.
Several results are worth mentioning. First, as the examples in sections 4 and
5.1 make clear, the result can hold even when a signicant majority of agents
are perfectly informed. (Indeed, if a majority of agents were misinformed, the
results would be trivial.) The key insight of this paper is that in the presence of
political competition, a small (but signicant) amount of misinformation can
result in a complete breakdown in the provision of public goods  a result
which is quite stark.

The very existence of misinformed voters creates an

incentive for a subset of the informed majority to exploit the misinformed, by
distorting policy in such a way that causes the misinformed to remain as such.
Moreover, the result is not strongly predicated on any interaction between

5

income and informedness. In particular, it is not crucial to the analysis that
the poor are more likely to be misinformed than the rich. Certainly, and in
contrast to Frank (2007), I do not suggest that the poor are systematically
duped by the rich to vote against their interests.
As a benchmark, I consider the case where an agent's informedness status is
independent of her income. Relative to this benchmark, the inecient outcome

7

becomes even more likely

if, holding constant the total number of informed

and misinformed agents, the misinformed are more likely to be drawn from
the poor. However, I also demonstrate that ineciencies can arise if only a
small number of below-median income earners are misinformed, but a large
number of slightly above-median income earners are misinformed.

(Such a

situation might be plausible with public goods such as social insurance, which
the poor are much more likely to be acquainted with than the middle class.)
This latter case makes clear that the culpability for slippery-slope ineciencies
need not lie with the misinformed poor  misinformation at other portions of
the income distribution can also cause ineciencies to arise.
Second, the model exhibits an

ends-against-the-middle

avor (see Epple and

Romano (1996)). As will become clear, political competition pits the informed
poor against a coalition of the informed rich and all misinformed agents (including the misinformed poor). The stability of this coalition depends upon
the misinformed poor not becoming informed. Indeed  although the misinformed all vote the same way, regardless of income  the misinformed poor
tend to work against their interests much more than the misinformed rich.
Since the informed rich have a strategic interest in under-providing the public
good, the misinformed rich may still be acting in their best interests in demanding less of the public good  even if only unwittingly. By contrast, the
misinformed poor really would regret their choice, after becoming informed.
Third, in the context of nancing public goods, the prevalence of the slippery
slope phenomenon is related to the amount of inequality in the polity. In a

7 There is no uncertainty in this model. Throughout this paper, I use terms such as
`likelihood' to refer to the size of the set of parameters for which the outcome is ecient or
not.
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relatively equal society, the cost to the pivotal voter of ceding power is relatively small, since the new pivotal voter will demand only a slightly larger level
of public good in the future. Whilst this is not optimal from the perspective
of the current pivotal voter, it is preferable to the inecient outcome where
none of the public good is provided. By contrast, if society is very unequal,
then the future median voter may be much poorer, and so demand a much
larger level of public spending than the current pivotal voter is willing to tolerate. As such, inecient under-provision of the public good does not arise
from the learning mechanism alone  but rather through the interaction with
inequality.

In this paper, I dene a measure of inequality that is analogous

to, but distinct from, Lorenz dominance. I show that under this measure, the
slippery-slope motivated incentive to under-provide public goods (to prevent
learning) is increasing in the amount of inequality in the economy.
A notable feature of the model is that it endogenously explains both a status
quo bias towards inecient policies, as well as the incentive for gradualism
in policy making.

The status quo bias arises directly from the incentive to

prevent learning.

By contrast, the incentive for gradualism stems from the

understanding that even small changes will  if they cause learning  result
in political power shifting in a favorable way, which will make further reforms
possible. Gradualism is not merely born from a pragmatic notion of `taking
what one can get', given political constraints.

As the analysis in section 6

demonstrates, these choices are made with the expectation of a `domino'-like
eect as the identity of the pivotal voter changes.
This paper contributes to, and extends, several strands of the existing political economy literature.

At its core, the ineciency in this model arises

from the endogenous time inconsistency in the decision makers' preferences,
arising out of the changing identity of the pivotal voter.

This feature is

common to many models of ineciencies in policy making (especially scal policy), including Persson and Svensson (1989),Roberts (1989), Alesina
and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Dewatripont and Roland
(1992), Benabou (2000), Battaglini and Coate (2007), Battaglini and Coate
(2008), amongst many others.

However, in contrast to many of these mod-
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els, and similar to Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Benabou and Ok (2001),
the shifting political power is not exogenous, but endogenous to the current
agent's policy choice. Interestingly, and in strong contrast to this paper, the
redistribution technology in Benabou and Ok (2001) causes the pivotal agent
to be relatively richer in the future when redistribution is provided - causing a
similar disincentive to favor redistributive policies, when there is policy stickiness. Indeed, policy momentum is another feature of this model that is present
in Benabou and Ok (2001). (In that paper, it is the fear by the current poor
that the redistributive policy that will make rich in the short run, will persist
long enough to eventually expropriate their future wealth.) However, policy
inertia is hard-wired into their model.

This paper is more standard in that

it allows the polity to change its policy in every period. Reform momentum
arises as an equilibrium phenomenon rather than as a feature of the model
technology.

Although the mechanism that generates the behaviors are dis-

tinct, reform momentum in this model results in an incentive for gradualism
in policy making, similar to Dewatripont and Roland (1992).
Several papers investigate the relationship between inequality and the demand
for public goods or redistribution.

Standard models (e.g.

Romer (1975),

Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Moene and Wallerstein (2001), amongst others) show that redistribution and higher public goods provision are more likely
when inequality is high and the income prole is right skewed. As inequality
worsens, the relatively poorer median voter has a greater incentive to expropriate the rich.

Benabou (2000) presents a model in which redistribution

generates aggregate social gains. In this model, the standard eect (increasing
inequality begetting a greater impetus for redistribution) is present. However,
a separate eect exists, whereby increasing inequality decreases the incentives
for redistribution, since the social gains will not be shared as equitably. This
results in a `U-shaped' eect where increasing inequality rst reduces the likelihood of redistribution, and then increases it.

In my model, an increase in

inequality uniformly decreases the likelihood of public goods provision, which
puts it in stark contrast to the existing literature.
Finally, this paper extends upon a growing literature concerning learning in a
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political economy context. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) consider a model in
which asymmetric information about the identity of winners and losers from a
reform may cause the reform to fail, even if the reform makes the average agent
better o. Similar to this paper, although using a dierent mechanism, that
paper nds an endogenous bias towards status quo policies.

A more recent

set of papers consider the incentives for agents to choose policies that aect
the learning of others. Strulovici (2010) studies learning in bandit problems
when decisions (about how to experiment) are made collectively by majority
vote. Baker and Mezzetti (2012), Fox and Vanberg (2011) and Parameswaran
(2013), consider models of the judiciary in which learning occurs after courts
observe the outcomes of agent choices. For example, in Parameswaran (2013),
and Fox and Vanberg (2011), agents have an incentive to skew their choices
(or to make choices that appear sub-optimal when dynamic considerations are
ignored) to prevent learning by the court, and consequently aect the way that
legal rules evolve.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2 I introduce
the formal model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal stage game policies in
the absence of any dynamic considerations, and formalizes the notion of effective income. Section 4 characterizes the Markovian equilibrium in a game
with the simple learning technology described above. Section 5 analyzes the
comparative static eects of varying inequality and informedness, on equilibrium public goods provision. Section 6 provides several extensions, including
a demonstration that the results in section 4 are robust to general learning
technologies. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.

2

Baseline Model

There are a continuum of voters with mass

1.

Each voter

+

i ∈ [0, 1] has income

F (y) with support Y ⊂ < (possibly nite). The
mean and median incomes are y (F ) (assumed nite) and ym (F ), respectively.

yi

drawn from a distribution

9

There is a public good
The public good costs

g

p.

which gives utility

Ag α

with

A>0

and

0 < α < 1.8

The government can nance spending on public goods

by levying a uniform linear tax on income

τ .9

To focus on the implications of

mistakes and learning, I abstract from the distortionary eects of taxation by
considering a pure endowment economy.
Voters can either be informed
knows the true value of

γ (y, F )

A,

(I)

or misinformed

(M ).

whilst misinformed voters believe

Let

y

is

Since there are a continuum of voters, this is also represents the

proportion of informed voters at each income level.

Y

A = 0.

denote the conditional probability that an agent with income

informed.

R

An informed voter

γ (y) dF (y),

Denote by

the number of informed voters in the polity.

that follows, I assume that

γ>

γ (F ) =

In everything

1 10
.
2

θ = (y, t) indicates her income level and state of informedness.
Θ = Y × {I, M } be the set of possible voter types. The distribution of

A voter's type
Let

types is given by:

Z

y

Pr [Y ≤ y, t = I] =

γ (x) dF (x)
Z y
γ (x) dF (x)
Pr [Y ≤ y, t = M ] = F (y) −
0

0

There is a technology through which misinformed agents become informed. Let

Q (·, ·)

denote this technology, where

γ 0 = Q (g, γ)

denotes the future prole

of informedness as a function of the current prole and the current level of

8 The functional form choice is simply for tractability.

The results generalize to any

increasing, concave function that is bounded from below.

9 Again, proportional taxation is purely for simplicity. More generally, let

T (y, g) be a
y , if the
R
T
(y,
g)
dF
(y)
= pg .
Y

feasible tax schedule, representing the amount of taxes paid by an agent with income
government provides

g

units of the public good. Feasibility implies

∂2T
∂g∂y > 0  i.e. the marginal rate of taxation is
increasing in the level of public goods, at every level of income. (Since the marginal cost
∂T
of public goods provision is
∂g , this condition implies that the marginal cost is rising with
income.) The condition admits certain classes of regressive income tax schedules.
10 The case of γ < 1 is trivial. The misinformed are a majority and have identical
2
The results generalize to the case where

preferences that are maximized when

g = 0.

Hence, the public good is never provided.

10

public goods provision.

11

In the baseline model, I consider a special case of

this technology in which all agents learn the true value of the public good
whenever a positive quantity is provided. I.e.

Q (γ, g) =

where

1∈Γ


γ

g=0

1

g>0

is the informedness prole in which

γ (y) = 1

for all

y.

In section

6, I consider a more general class of learning technologies and show that the
baseline results are robust to these alternative technologies.
The income distribution is common knowledge. I assume that the informedness prole and learning technology are known by the informed agents  i.e.
the informed are aware that some agents are misinformed. By contrast, I assume that the misinformed are ignorant of their misinformedness and of the
possibility that learning might take place. Since the dynamics of the model
arise only through learning, this implies that the misinformed will support the
policy that maximizes their stage utility.

12

There are two political parties who are purely oce motivated.
period, each party announces a feasible scal policy

In every

(τ, g) that it is committed

to implement if it is elected. All agents vote, and the party receiving a majority
of the vote is elected.

All agents discount the future at the common rate

δ ∈ [0, 1).

3

The Stage Game

This section is in two parts. In the rst part, I characterize the optimal stagepolicy for each type of agent. As will become apparent, the game is dynamic

11 To make stark the mechanism at play in this model, I assume that learning is only
possible through acquaintance with the public good. Of course, other channels exist in the
real world  although they would presumably not provide an incentive to skew the provision
of public goods, which is the focus of this paper's inquiry.

12 The results are robust to endowing parties with partial policy motivation, as long as

some oce motivation remains.
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only insofar as current policy choices may change the identity of future decision
makers. Hence, the optimal policy in any sub-game where the preferences of
future decision makers is no longer subject to change will correspond to the
optimal stage-game policy. In particular, this will be the case when all agents
are informed (γ

= 1)

so that no further learning is possible.

3.1 Ideal Policies
Consider type

θ = (y, t)

agent. Her ideal stage policy is given by:



pg
max 1 −
g≥0
y
where

pg = τ y



yi + At g α

represents the government's budget constraint.

veried that agents' preferences are single-peaked in

g.

It is easily

The optimal amount

of public spending for a type-(y, t) agent is:


g (y, t) =
Obviously, for every

y , g (y, M ) = 0,

At α y
p y

1
 1−α

and for

y 0 > y , 0 < g (y 0 , I) < g (y, I).

Hence, misinformed agents will never provide the public good (and, hence, will
always choose a zero tax rate). Informed agents will choose positive taxation
and spending, although lower income earners prefer more of each than higher
income earners.
The indirect-utility of a type-(y

0

, t0 )

agent, when a type-(y, t) agent's optimal

policy is implemented, is:

y0
u(y0 ,t0 ) (g (y, t)) = y 0 + At0 − αAt
y




αAt y
p y

In particular, the pivotal agent herself receives utility:


u(y,t) (g (y, t)) = y + (1 − α) At
12

αAt y
p y

α
 1−α

α
 1−α

Although they may dier about the ideal level of provision, all informed voters
agree that this ideal level is strictly positive.

Along the Pareto frontier, a

positive quantity of the public good will always be provided.

In this sense,

providing none of the public good very clearly entails an inecient underprovision.

3.2 Eective Incomes and the Eective Median
In the previous subsection, I showed that stage preferences are single peaked
and that the ideal policies of informed agents are monotonic in their incomes.
Then, if all agents were informed, the median income earner would be pivotal.
However, this monotonicity no longer holds when some agents are misinformed,
as all misinformed agents, regardless of income, demand none of the public
good.

More generally, with misinformed voters, the type-space of voters is

multidimensional  voters are distinguished by both their income and their
informedness status. Indeed, with multidimensionality of this sort, the notion
of a `median' voter is, in general, not well dened.
However, as I show below, the eect of misinformedness is for agents to express
preferences that are identical to the preferences that would be asserted by a
richer, correctly informed agent. To see this, consider an agent with income

y

and who values the public good at

At ≥ 0.

(To show the generality of this

approach, I allow the agent to be misinformed in any way, so I do not yet
require that

AM = 0.)

For any level of public goods provision,

g,

the agent's

utility is:






At
pg A
pg
α
α
y + At g =
1−
y + Ag
u(y,t) (g) =
1−
y
A
y At
which represents the same preference as a correctly informed agent with income

x (y, t) =

A
y.
At

I refer to

x (y, t)

as the agent's `eective income'.

It is the

income level at which a correctly informed agent would evaluate policies in
the same way as the agent in question.

In the simple model, where agents

are either correctly informed, or believe the public good is worthless, eective

13

income is given by:

x (y, t) =


y

t=I

∞

t=M

Naturally, the eective income of a correctly informed agent is simply their

13

actual income, whilst the eective income of a misinformed agent is innite.

The notion of eective income reduces the type-space from two-dimensions (encoding income

y

and the valuation of public goods

At ) into a single-dimension.

Eective income is a summary statistic for agent preferences.

Since, by as-

sumption, misinformed agents systematically undervalue public goods, the effective income prole of the polity appears richer than the true income prole.
Following the analysis in the previous subsection, agents' ideal stage-policies

14

are monotonic in their eective income.

Hence, when voters are ordered ac-

cording to their eective income, standard median voter results (Black (1948),
Downs (1957) etc.) apply.
Let

xm (γ, F )

denote the median eective income, given income prole

informedness prole

γ.

15

The eective median income is

xm (γ, F ) =


inf

z∈Y

Rz
0

γ (y) dF (y) ≥

∞

1
2

F

and

:

γ>

1
2

γ<

1
2

Since misinformed agents upwardly skew the eective income distribution, the
eective median income will be (weakly) larger than the true median income.
Indeed, for any

γ ∈ Γ, xm (γ, F ) ≥ ym (F ).

Misinformedness causes the ef-

fective median voter to be richer than the true median and  since the ideal
level of public goods provision is monotonically decreasing in eective income
 causes the polity to choose a lower level of public goods provision than

13 Innite eective income is an immediate consequence of the assumption that

AM = 0.

In section 6, I discuss consider approaches to relaxing this assumption.
1
1


 1−α
 1−α
y
g (y, t) = Apt α yy
= Aα
= g (x (y, t) , I) - which is monotonip x(y,t)
cally decreasing in x.
R
15 If F is continuous, then the top expression simplies to xm (γ,F ) γ (y) dF (y) = 1 .
2
0

14 Indeed,

14

would be implied by the income prole alone.

En masse,

the electorate ap-

pears to be more `scally conservative' than one would infer from the income
distribution alone.

4

16

Model with Simple Learning Technology

In this section, I characterize the dynamic equilibrium with the simple learning

Vθ (γ) be the value
prole γ . If γ = 1, then

technology. I solve for a Markov perfect equilibrium. Let
function for a type

θ

voter, given an informedness

the true median is pivotal in the current period and all future periods. (This
follows since the current policy does not aect the continuation game, and so
agents' lifetime preferences over policy are simply given by their stage preferences  and these are single-peaked.) Then, the optimal policy is simply the
one that maximizes the median agent's stage preferences, and so:
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pg
α
ym + Ag + δV(ym ,1) (1)
g (1) = arg max
1−
g
y

 1
Aα y 1−α
= g (ym , I) =
p ym


∗

Since the state never changes, for any type

(y, t),

the value function is given

by:

"


 α #
y
1
αA y 1−α
V(y,t) (1) =
y + At − αA
1−δ
ym
p ym
16 Note again that this result would remain true even if I relaxed the assumption that
the misinformed believe that the public good is worthless (i.e.

AM < A,

AM = 0).

Indeed, along as

the results that: (i) the eective median was richer than the true median (making

the electorate appear richer than it truly is) and (ii) the polity consequently chooses a lower
level of public goods provision, continue to hold.

17 Without confusion, I use g ∗ (γ) to denote the level of public goods chosen in equilibrium

when the informedness prole is
maximizes a

(y, t)-type

γ,

and

g (y, t)

agent's stage preferences.
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to denote the level of public goods that

Now, take any

γ 6= 1.

An informed agent's utility from having

g

units of the

public good provided is:

v (g; γ) =


 1−

pg
y

y + δV
It follows that if

g ∗ (γ) = 0,



y + At g α + δV(y,I) (1)

(y,I)

then

(γ)

V(y,I) (γ) =

if

g>0

if

g=0

(1)

1
y.
1−δ

Unlike in the stage game, in the dynamic setting where learning is possible,
preferences need no longer be single-peaked over the entire policy space. As (1)
makes clear, continuation payos are constant for any

g > 0,

and so over this

region, lifetime preferences are single-peaked, since stage preferences are singlepeaked. However, continuation payos are discontinuous at
the continuation payo from choosing
the continuation payo from
agent with income

y >

g > 0,

g = 0.

Moreover,

g = 0 may either be higher or lower than

depending on the agent's income. For an

1
y , it can be veried that:
α m

1
y
1−δ

> V(y,I) (1).

For

such agents, the median income earner's ideal policy is so far from their own
ideal, that receiving none of the public good forever is preferable to receiving
the median income earner's ideal level forever.

For these agents, although

g decreases from their ideal level to 0, it jumps up
1
discontinuously at g = 0. By contrast, for agents with y < ym , lifetime utility
α
is falling as g decreases to 0 and drops down discontinuously at g = 0, which
lifetime utility falls as

preserves single-peakedness. Although preferences are no longer single-peaked
for all agents in the dynamic setting, the following Lemma demonstrates that
the eective median voter is still pivotal:

Lemma 1. Let xm (γ, F ) be the eective median voter given informedness
prole γ . The following are true:
u(xm (γ,F ),I) (g = 0) > u(xm (γ,F ),I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I)).
x > xm (γ, F ), u(x,I) (g = 0) > u(x,I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I));

Then for all

u(xm (γ,F ),I) (g = 0) < u(xm (γ,F ),I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I)).
x < xm (γ, F ), u(x,I) (g = 0) < u(x,I) (g (xm (γ, F ) , I)).

Then for all

1. Suppose

2. Suppose

16

Lemma 1 shows that, if the eective median income earner prefers to not
provide the public good, then so will all agents whose eective income is larger
(i.e.

agents whose income is actually higher, or misinformed agents).

By

contrast, if the eective median prefers to provide her ideal stage-game level of
the public good, then so will all informed agents with lower income. Hence, the
governing coalition will either consist of the `informed poor' or the `rich' and
misinformed (where `rich' and `poor' indicate incomes relative to the eective
median).
The eective median faces a trade-o between choosing her ideal policy today
and giving up future political power on the one hand, and retaining political
power by not providing the public good at all.

Whilst retaining political

power is costly in that it requires an under provision of the public good, it may
outweigh the detriment of ceding political power and facing a much larger overprovision of the public good in the future. This will be true if the dierence in
income levels (and hence, dierence in ideal levels of public goods provision)
between the true median and eective median is large enough.

Proposition 1. There exists a unique κ (α, δ) >
of public goods provision is:

g ∗ (x (γ) , I)
m
∗
g (γ) =
0

1
α

s.t. the equilibrium level

xm (γ)
ym
xm (γ)
ym

<κ
>κ

∂κ
Moreover, κ (α, δ) satises: (1 − δ) (1 − α)+δ (1 − ακ) (κ) 1−α = 0, and ∂α
<0
and ∂κ
< 0.
∂δ
α

Proposition 1 demonstrates that the equilibrium level of public goods provision
can be in one of two regimes. If the eective median income is not too much
larger than the true median income, then the public good will be provided
in positive quantities in every period. Since the true median will demand a
level of public goods provision only slightly higher than the eective median's
ideal  the eective median voter nds it preferable to implement her ideal
policy today and tolerate a slightly larger provision of public goods in every
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future period, rather than retain political power by never providing the public
good. By contrast, if the true and eective median incomes dier by a large
amount, then public goods provision breaks down altogether.

The eective

median would rather not provide the public good at all, than receive her
desired amount today, and be subject to a sustained over-provision in the
future. The current decision maker chooses to implement an inecient policy
today for fear that implementing the stage-game ecient policy will lead her
down the slippery slope to policies that are even worse (from her perspective).
Given the above discussion, Proposition 1 eectively divides the parameterspace into two regions  an `Ecient Provision' region and a `Slippery-Slope
Ineciency' region. In the `Ecient Provision' region, positive quantities of
the public good are provided. These policies are ecient in the sense that they
correspond to the ideal stage policies of some voter, and hence lie on the Pareto
Frontier. By contrast, in the `Slippery Slope' region, the public good is not
provided at all, which is clearly inecient, since every informed agent would
ideally choose a positive level of public goods provision.

It is worth noting

that ecient provision need not be ecient in the sense of Samuelson (1954).
The ecient (Samuelson) level of the public good is
level at which the aggregate marginal benet

αAg α−1

g∗ =



αA
p

1
 1−α

 the

and the marginal cost

p

coincide. In standard models, where the median income earner is pivotal and
the income distribution is right-skewed, the equilibrium level of public goods
provision,

g (ym , I) =



αA y
p ym

1
 1−α

, will exceed this level.

Since the median

voter is liable for less than the true marginal cost of providing the public
good, the public good will be over-provided in the sense of Samuelson. In this
model, since the eective income of the pivotal voter is larger than the median
income, the equilibrium (short-run) level of public spending may be closer to
the Samuelson level. Indeed, these will coincide if the eective median income
coincides with the average income in the economy. Of course, if the eective
median income is larger still, there will be an under-provision of the public
good relative to the Samuelson level. Moreover, this eect only exists in the
short run.

In the long run, as learning takes place, and the pivotal voter
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converges to the median income earner, public spending will converge to the
higher-than-ecient level. This suggests a limited basis for a small amount of
misinformation to be desirable, in order to better align the costs faced by the
pivotal voter to aggregate social costs.
I end this section by considering a simple example in which informedness is
constant and independent of income.

This is a `judgment free' baseline of

sorts  it does not appeal to any informedness dierential between agents at
dierent levels of the income spectrum. In particular, I do not assume that
the poor are more or less likely to be informed than the rich.

(In section

5.2, I analyze how the equilibrium level of public goods provision may vary
with dierent informedness proles.)

I assume that income is log-normally

distributed, since this has been shown to be a reasonable approximation of the
income proles in many countries. I calibrate the income distribution to the
U.S. economy, using the Gini Coecient as a measure of inequality.

Example 1.
stant.

ln Y ∼ N (ln ym , σ 2 )

Suppose

and

The eective median income is given by

γ (y) = γ >
R xm
γdF (y) =
0

1
is con2
1
, where
2

 

is the distribution function. This implies that xm =
F (y) = Φ σ1 ln yym
 
−1 1
1
F −1 2γ
= ym eσΦ ( 2γ ) ≥ ym . By Proposition 1, the public good will not
1
σΦ−1 ( 2γ
x
) > κ which will be true if
be provided if m > κ. This implies e
ym

γ <

1
2Φ[ σ1 ln κ]

= γ̃ .

Hence, there is a threshold level of informedness below

which the public good will not be provided.
To get a sense of how much misinformation is required, suppose

δ = 0.95.

The former is calibrated to the Gini coecient measure of inequality

in the U.S. in 2010
income proles is
value

κ,

σ = 0.886 and
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using the property that the Gini coecient for log-normal

2Φ



√σ
2



− 1.

In the table below, I report the threshold

for several dierent parametric values of

α

(which parametrizes the

value of public spending), given the assumed value of
the threshold value

κ

is decreasing in

α.

δ.

As predicted above,

The table below also reports the

associated threshold informedness levels.

18 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the Gini Coecient for the United States was
0.469 in 2010. United States Census Bureau (2012)
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α
κ
γ̃

0.25
0.50
0.75
4.0987 2.0260 1.3406
0.5295 0.6351 0.7941

Example 1 demonstrates that misinformation about the value of public spending that is spread broadly throughout the population, can be sucient to
generate a complete breakdown in its provision. The result does not hinge on
the relationship between income and inequality. Importantly, it is not crucial
to the analysis that the poor are less informed than the rich.

Moreover, a

relatively small amount of misinformation may suce to stie provision of the
public good.

In the above example, when

α = 0.75,

public goods provision

34% above the true
median income. This implies that a misinformedness rate of 21% is sucient
to induce slippery slope ineciencies, even if the remaining 79% of voters are
ceases entirely if the eective median income is more than

correctly informed and would ideally demand positive provision of the public
good.

In example 3, in the following section, I compare this result to the

outcome in cases when information is not income independent.

5

Comparative Statics

In this section, I examine the comparative statics of changes in the income
and informedness proles on the equilibrium level of public goods provision.

5.1 Inequality and the Slippery Slope
The main result from the previous section is that ineciencies arise when the
eective and true median incomes are suciently disparate. Of course, as was
shown in section 3, this dierence in incomes is endogenous to the model, and
is as a function of both the true income distribution and the informedness
prole. In the introduction to this paper, I noted that many previous papers
predict relationships between inequality and public goods provision  that
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these are positively related according to standard models, and `U-shaped' in
Benabou (2000).

In this section, I demonstrate that for an appropriately

dened measure of inequality, an increase in inequality will be associated with
a larger separation between eective and true median incomes  and, as such,
with a greater likelihood of a slippery-slope motivated under-provision of the
public good.
Since our question concerns the eect of inequality on public goods provision,
the comparative static analysis ideally considers the eect of a change in the
income distribution, keeping the informedness prole xed. However, in section 2, the informedness prole was dened conditionally upon the income
distribution. Hence, as the income distribution changes, we must take care to
appropriately modify the informedness prole as well. (To see why, suppose
that

γ

was kept unchanged, which is equivalent to assuming that it is inde-

pendent of the income distribution. Then a change in the income prole will
generically change the number of agents associated with each income level,
and this will aect the aggregate informedness level.) To do so, I assume that
the informedness prole is
set, and let

FY

Denition 1.

Let

Y ⊂ <+

be a convex

denote the set of continuous distribution functions on
An informedness prole

F1 , F2 ∈ FY ,

−1
γ F2 (p) |F2 .

for any

income-rank independent.
γ (·|·)

and for any quantile

Y.

is income-rank independent if

p ∈ (0, 1), γ F1−1 (p) |F1



=

Income-rank independence essentially says that the likelihood that an agent is
informed depends only upon his rank in the income distribution (as measured
by the quantile into which his income falls), and not the income level itself.
This property ensures that the informedness of agents remains unchanged,
even as their incomes are perturbed.

Proposition 2. Let F1 , F2 ∈ FY and let the informedness prole γ (·|·)
2)
1)
≤ xymm(γ,F
if and only if
be income-rank independent. Then xymm(γ,F
(F1 )
(F2 )


(F2 )
.
F1 (xm (γ, F1 )) ≥ F2 xm (γ, F1 ) yym
m (F1 )
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Proposition 2 provides a sucient condition on the distribution functions for
the deviation between eective and true median incomes to diverge. To get
the intuition, consider the case where

ym (F1 ) = ym (F2 ),

so that the median

incomes coincide under both income proles. With income-rank independence,
the median eective income must occupy the same income quantile regardless
of the actual income distribution. It is sucient to check whether the eective
median income under the rst income prole

xm (γ, F1 )

is associated with a

higher or lower quantile under the second income prole. In the latter case,
the new eective median income

xm (γ, F1 )

xm (γ, F2 )

must be larger, since income level

F2 . When
prole F2 up or

occupies a quantile that is too low under income prole

the medians dier, it suces to simply scale income under

down in a proportional manner such that the medians do coincide. Combined
with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 addresses the relationship between dierent
income proles and the likelihood of slippery-slope ineciencies.
Of course, Proposition 2 does not directly address the relationship between
slippery slope incentives and inequality.

To do so, I introduce a notion of

inequality that is analogous to, but distinct from, Lorenz dominance.
that

Y1

Y2

is more equal than

Denition 2.
Fi (y)

and

tively.

Y2

whenever

Let

ym (Fi )

is a

Y1

and

Y2

if

Y2

is a

median-normalized spread

be random variables, and for each

Y1 .

i ∈ {1, 2},

let

be the associated distribution function and median, respec-

median-normalized spread

z<1

of

I say

and

Y1 , if F2 (zym (F2 )) ≥ F1 (zym (F1 ))
F2 (zym (F2 )) ≤ F1 (zym (F1 )) whenever z > 1.
of

The notion of a median-normalized spread is intimately related to that of a
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. Indeed, Y2 is a median-normalized spread of Y1 if
Y1
Y2
is a median-preserving spread of
. Two properties of
and only if
ym (F2 )
ym (F1 )
median-preserving spread

median-normalized spreads recommend its use as an income inequality ranking.

First, if

Y1

and

Y2

share a common median, then median-normalized

spreads and median-preserving spreads are equivalent concepts.

19 Formally

There is a

F2 is a median preserving spread of F1 , if F1 and F2 share a common median,
ym (i.e. F1 (ym ) = 12 = F2 (ym )), and if F2 (y) ≥ F1 (y) whenever y < ym and F2 (y) ≤ F1 (y)
whenever y > ym . See Mendelson (1987) and Malamud and Trojani (2009).
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clear sense in which the notion of a median-preserving spread provides a (partial) inequality ranking of income distributions. Although in both cases the
median agent receives the same income, more agents under

F1 .

that are distant from the median than under

F2

receive incomes

Income under

F2

is less

concentrated around the median income.
Second, normalizing by the median income ensures that the inequality ranking is invariant to arbitrary scaling. A failure of scale invariance would, for
example, cause the measure of inequality to potentially vary depending on
which unit of currency is used to measure income. Naturally, scale invariance
is a property shared by many other measures of inequality, including Lorenz
functions
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, and their associated measures, such as the Gini coecient. Im-

portantly for the analysis, scale invariance allows for a comparison of income
distributions across economies with dierent median incomes.
Finally, there is a noteworthy analogy between median-normalized spreads
and Lorenz dominance as measures of inequality. As Atkinson (1970), Thistle (1989) and the proof of Lemma 3 indicate,
the sense of Lorenz dominance if and only if
spread of

Y1

is more equal that

Y2

in

1
Y is a mean-preserving
E[Y2 ] 2

1
Y . Lorenz dominance requires that, after normalizing the inE[Y1 ] 1

come distributions to ensure that the means are equal, one distribution is a
mean-preserving spread of the other. By contrast, the measure of inequality
used in this paper requires that, after normalizing the income distributions to
ensure that medians are equal, one distribution is a median-preserving spread
of the other. The similarity between the approaches is obvious.

Lemma 2. Let F1 , F2 ∈ FY and let γ (·|·) be any income-rank independent
informedness prole. Suppose F2 is more unequal than F1 in the sense of
1)
2)
median-normalized spreads. Then xm (γ,F
≤ xm (γ,F
.
ym
ym
Lemma 2 demonstrates the relationship between inequality and the dispersion
between the eective and true median incomes. Suppose income prole

20 Given an income distribution

F,

F1

Lorenz dominates

F2

if

p
L1 (p) ≥ L2 (p) for
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is

R −1
1 F (p)
ydF (y) meay 0
percent of income earners. Income

the Lorenz function

sures the fraction of total income held by the lowest
distribution

Y2

L (p) =

every

p ∈ [0, 1].

more unequal than

Y1

in the sense of median-normalized spreads. Then the

distance between the true and eective median incomes will be larger under
than

F1 .

F2

Combined with Proposition 1, this implies that the likelihood that

the equilibrium will be in the slippery slope regime, and that public goods
provision will break down altogether, is larger in the more unequal society.
This is a stark result. In contrast to standard results, an increase in inequality
may be associated with a signicant decrease in public goods provision. As
inequality worsens, the incomes of the pivotal voter and the median income
earner diverge, and consequently, the current pivotal voter will be more wary
of ceding political power.
Note that the sense in which public goods provision is less likely is that the
economy is more likely to be in the slippery slope regime.

However, if the

equilibrium remains in the ecient provision regime after inequality worsens,
then the level of public goods provision may actually go up.

Although the

decision to provide public goods or not depends upon the ratio of the eective
and true median incomes, conditional upon positive provision, the quantity
provided depends on the ratio between the eective median and

average

in-

comes. By construction, the medians of median-normalized spreads coincide
(after normalization).
prole

F2 ,

Nevertheless, if average income is much larger under

then the pivotal voter may indeed demand a larger quantity of the

public good. Intuitively, this will be the case if

y(F2 )
y(F1 )

≥

xm (γ,F2 )
.
xm (γ,F1 )

Of course, median-normalized spreads is just one approach to measuring income inequality.

I have already argued that there is a strong analogy be-

tween median-normalized spreads and Lorenz dominance (which is related to
mean-preserving spreads).

Under certain conditions, it can be shown that

median-normalized spreads imply Lorenz dominance.

Lemma 3. Let F1 , F2 ∈ FY and suppose F2 is a median-normalized spread
2)
1)
of F1 . Furthermore, suppose yȳ(F
≥ yȳ(F
and suppose there is a unique z
m (F2 )
m (F1 )
at which the functions F1 (ȳ (F1 ) z) and F2 (ȳ (F2 ) z) cross. Then F1 Lorenz
dominates F2 .
Lemma 3 shows that, if two additional conditions are met, an increase in
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inequality in the sense of median-normalized spreads implies an increase in
inequality in the sense of Lorenz dominance.

The rst condition requires

that higher inequality causes the median and mean incomes to diverge, which
implies that increasing inequality skews income towards the rich. The second
condition is a single crossing property on distribution functions of the meannormalized income proles.

In general, median-normalized spreads are, by

themselves, not sucient to guarantee that these two conditions hold, and
hence are not generically sucient for Lorenz dominance.
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However, the

following corollary provides a sucient condition for a median-normalizing
spread to be sucient for Lorenz dominance.

Corollary 1. Let F1 , F2 ∈ FY and suppose F2 is a median-normalized spread
1)
2)
= yȳ(F
. Then F1 Lorenz dominates F2 .
of F1 satisfying yȳ(F
m (F2 )
m (F1 )
Although the additional sucient conditions make the results in Lemma 3 and
Corollary 1 quite specialized, they are satised whenever a median-normalized
spread exists within several classes of commonly used distributions. For example, suppose

Y1

and

Y2

are log-normal income proles, and that

median-normalized spread of

Y1 .

(This will be true if

of the median incomes in each prole.)

σ2 ≥ σ1 ,

Y2

is a

regardless

Then both additional conditions in

Lemma 3 are immediately satised, and so

Y1

Lorenz dominates

Y2 .

The same

result holds for income proles that are both drawn from the Pareto, Weibull
and Uniform families of distributions - all of which are commonly used in
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modeling the distribution of income in society.

In fact, for income proles

21 To see that median-normalized spreads do not imply Lorenz dominance, consider the


Y1 ∈ 12 , 1, 32 each with probability 13 , and Y2 ∈
8
1 1
7
with probabilities
5 , 1, 5
3 , 5 and 15 , respectively. Clearly Y2 is a median-normalized
91
spread of Y1  indeed, it is a median-preserving spread. Furthermore ȳ (F2 ) =
75 >
following discrete income distributions:

2

1 = ȳ (F1 ) and so the rst sucient condition is satised. However, it is easily veried
F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · z) and F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · z) do not satisfy single-crossing. Indeed, F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · z) ≥
F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · z) for z ≤ 1 and for z ≥ 120
3, we can show that Lorenz
91 . Consistent with Lemma


1
1
370


p< 3
p < 13
2p
 999 p
1
2
25
185
1
8
functions are given by L1 =
and L2 =
and
p − 16
3 ≤p< 3
27 p − 999
3 ≤ p < 15


3
 40
1
2
13
8
p≥ 3
p ≥ 15
2p − 2
27 p − 27
17
these functions do not respect Lorenz dominance, since they intersect at p =
26 .
that

22 I demonstrate that this is the case for the log-normal distribution. The other cases
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drawn from these four classes of distributions, a median-normalized spread is
necessary and sucient for Lorenz dominance  the two notions of inequality
are equivalent.
Of course, these results do not generally hold true for arbitrary pairs of distribution functions. As noted above, and in the example in footnote 21, mediannormalized spreads do not generically imply Lorenz dominance. Conversely,
as Example 2, below, demonstrates, Lorenz dominance does not imply that a
median-normalized spread exists. In fact, as the example shows, it is possible for public goods provision to be more likely (and slippery slope concerns
to be less likely) in an economy that is more unequal in the sense of Lorenz
dominance.

Example 2.

Y = [0, αy] where α ∈ (1, 2] and consider income distribu1
 β−1
y
tions: F1 =
for y ∈ [0, βy] with β ≤ α, and F2 piece-wise dened
βy
1
with F2 (y) = 1 −
for y ∈ [0, αy) and F2 (αy) = 1. (Under F2 , the lowest
α
1
1
1 − α ≤ 2 fraction of the population earn nothing, whilst the remainder all
earn αȳ . The case of α = β = 2 is especially straight-forward  income is uniformly distributed under F1 , whereas, under F2 , half the population receives
nothing and the other half receives 2y .) Under both proles the mean income
α−1
β
is ȳ . The Lorenz functions are: L1 (p) = p and L2 (p) = 0 for p <
and
α
α−1
L2 (p) = αp + 1 − α for p ≥ α . It is easy to verify that F1 Lorenz dominates
F2 . However, it is easily veried that F2 is not a median-normalized spread of
F1 . Consistent with Lemma 2, the distance between true and eective median
incomes is smaller under F2 even though F2 is more unequal in the sense of
Let



 i.e. ln Yi ∼
 Y1 and Y2 be log-normally
 distributed

ln z
ln z
F2 (m2 z) = Φ σ2 and F1 (m1 z) = Φ σ1 . It is easily veried that

are demonstrated analogously. Let

N



ln mi , σi2 . Then

1 2
ȳ(Fi )
2σ .
ym (Fi ) = e
ȳ(F2 )
ȳ(F1 )
Hence, if F2 is a median-normalized spread of F1 (i.e. if σ2 > σ1 ), then
ym (F2 ) > ym (F1 )
and so the rst condition is automatically satised. Furthermore, for each i, Fi (ȳ (Fi ) · z) =


ln z+ 12 σ 2
Φ
. It is easily demonstrated that if F2 is a median-normalized spread of F1 ,
σ

F2

can only be a median-normalized spread of

then

F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · z) > F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · z)

only if

F1

if

z < exp

σ2 ≥ σ1 .

For each

i,

1

2 σ1 σ2 , which veries that single-

crossing is satised. Finally, the Lorenz function associated with a log-normal distribution

L (p) = Φ Φ−1 (p) − σ . Clearly L1 (p) ≥ L2 (p) for any (and every) p i σ1 ≤ σ2 .
Y1 Lorenz dominates Y2 if and only if Y2 is a median-normalized spread of Y1 .

is
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Hence,

Lorenz dominance.

Indeed, this result is true even if the informedness pro-

les were dierent in the two economies. To see why, note that under

F2 ,

the

median income is also the maximum income, and so the eective median and
true median share the same income
1 ,F1 )
γ1 and γ2 , xmym(γ(F
1)

F2 )

≥1=

αȳ .

Hence, for any informedness proles

xm (γ2 ,F2 )
. The less equal society (with income prole
ym (F2 )

will always choose the maximum amount of public goods feasible in any

political equilibrium, whereas the public good may not be provided at all in
the more equal society.

5.2 Nature of Informedness Prole
The previous subsection examined the eect of a changing income prole on
the likelihood of public goods provision. In this subsection, I briey consider
the eect of dierent informedness proles on the provision of public goods.

Remark 1.
y∈Y

γ1 , γ2 ∈ Γ and suppose
xm (γ2 ,F )
1 ,F )
). Then
≤ xmym(γ(F
.
ym (F )
)
Let

γ2 ≥ γ1

(i.e.

γ2 (y) ≥ γ2 (y)

for every

Remark 1 makes the fairly obvious point that a change in the income prole
that (weakly) increases the likelihood that every income earner is informed,
will cause the the eective median agent to have lower income. As the polity
becomes more informed across the board, the proportion of below median
income earners who are informed increases, and so one does not need to travel
as far up the income distribution to nd the eective median.
A more interesting question considers the eect of a change in the informedness
prole that reduces the likelihood of being informed at some income levels,
and increases it at others.

Recall, in section 4, I introduced Example 1 in

which the informedness prole was constant, and hence independent of income.
I referred to that case as the `judgment-free' baseline as the poor were no
less likely to be misinformed than the rich. In Example 3, below, I consider
two variants of the baseline example, in which the informedness prole is no
longer constant.

In both cases, I keep the total number of informed agents

in the economy unchanged.

In the rst case, I reduce the likelihood that
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below median income earners are informed and increase the likelihood that
above median income earners are informed. In the second case, I increase the
likelihood that below median income earners and very high income earners are
informed, and reduce the likelihood that upper-middle class voters (those
with slightly above median incomes) are informed.

Example 3.
so that

Suppose

γ 1 =γ .

ln y ∼ N (ln ym , σ 2 )

and

Under informedness prole

γ1 ,

γ1 (y) =


1

y > ym

2γ − 1

y ≤ ym

only below median-income

γ2 be as dened below, which again
satises γ 2 = γ . Under prole γ2 , only 2% of below-median income earners are
voters are misinformed. By contrast, let

misinformed, however the next block of middle-income earners are completely
misinformed, whilst the highest income earners are perfectly informed. (One
might interpret this as a case where the public good involves social insurance,
which the current poor are much more likely to be acquainted with than the
middle class.)




0.98


γ2 (y) = 0



1

y < ym
y ∈ [ym , F −1 (1.49 − γ)]
y > F −1 (1.49 − γ)

It turns out that the eective median income is the same in both cases, and
−1 3
xm (γ) = ym eσΦ ( 2 −γ ) . There will be slippery-slope

σΦ−1 ( 23 −γ )
3
ineciencies if: κ < e
which will be true if γ < γ̃ =
− Φ σ1 ln κ .
2
Again calibrating to the U.S. economy, and using the sample values for α from

has income dened by

Example 1, gives the following threshold values:

α
κ
γ̃

0.25
0.50
0.75
4.0987 2.0260 1.3406
0.5557 0.7127 0.8704

A comparison of the outcomes in Examples 1 and 3 highlights the important
features of the role of the informedness prole in determining the eective
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median (and hence in the likelihood of public goods provision). Relative to
the baseline, both cases in Example 3 involve a transfer of informedness from
either poor or moderately-high income earners, to the super rich. Since the
aggregate level of informedness was unchanged, this necessarily caused the
median eective income to increase. (If more agents with incomes above the
original median eective income are informed, and total informedness is unchanged, then fewer agents with incomes below the original median eective
income can be informed. But this implies that the new eective median income
must be larger.) Hence, any aggregate-information neutral change in the informedness prole that uniformly increases the informedness level of very high
income earners is likely to cause the median-eective income to increase.

Ce-

teris paribus, public goods provision is more likely to break down in economies

where the poor are far less informed than the rich. A poorly informed lowerclass exacerbates slippery-slope concerns, relative to the judgment-free baseline.

This is illustrated in the rst case above (with

α = 0.75),

where the

relative lack of information by the poor causes the public good to not be provided even if

87% of the population (and 74% of below median income earners)

are correctly informed. By contrast, in the `judgment-free' case, aggregate informedness needed to be below

80%

for slippery slope concerns to take eect.

However, as Example 3 also makes clear, signicant misinformation amongst
the poor is not crucial to generating slippery slope concerns  culpability
for the breakdown in public goods provision, need not always lie with the
poor. Indeed, concentrating misinformation in the middle of the income distribution can equally exacerbate problems. The informedness prole interacts
with the income prole in an obvious way to determine the median eective
income. But for two informedness proles that generate the same median effective income, the specic details of which agents were likely to be informed
or not is inconsequential to the outcome. As Example 3 demonstrates, it is
unimportant whether misinformation occurs amongst the poorest voters, or
middle-class voters, as long as between these groups, suciently many agents
are misinformed.

Of course, if every below-median income earner were cor-

rectly informed, then the eective median income would be the true median
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income, and slippery slope concerns could never arise.

Hence, misinforma-

tion amongst the poor is important to the analysis. However, it is not crucial
that the poor are more likely to be misinformed than other members of the
community.

6

Extensions

In this section, I consider two variants of the model that extend the results to
more general settings. In the rst case, I consider a general learning technology, and show that the results from the main section continue to hold. This
extension demonstrates that focusing on the very special learning technology in
the previous sections was without much loss of generality. In the second case,
I discuss the implications of the assumption that misinformed agents do not
value the public good at all, and suggest methods of relaxing this assumption
that preserve the model's results.

6.1 General Learning Technologies and Gradualism
The previous section characterized equilibrium provision of public goods under a simple and stark learning technology. In this section, I show that the
main results continue to hold when more general learning technologies are
considered. In so doing, I show that the above results do not arise out of the
special features of the learning technology  but rather from the very fact of
misinformation and learning.

yH > yL and
1
23
poor agents.
The informedness prole is given by the vector
2

Consider a simple income distribution, with two income types

F (yL ) = φ >

23 The two-income-type assumption ensures that there is only one type of agent whose
dynamic choices need to be modeled, since the choices of the uninformed and the informed
poor are stationary. Extending to many income types requires the current dynamic decision
maker to take into account the eect of his current choice on the future choices of other
dynamically sophisticated decision makers with dierent preferences. This introduces all the
usual time-inconsistency complications into the analysis. Note, however, that the limitation
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γ = (γL , γH ) ∈ [0, 1]2 .

Let


Γ = (yL , yH ) ∈ ∆| φγL + (1 − φ) γH ≥

1
2

be the

set of informedness proles where the eective median voter is informed. The
eective median has income:


y
L
xm (γ) =
y

H

Let

n
Γ = γ ∈ Γ|γL >
L

are pivotal, and let
rich are pivotal.

1
2φ

ΓH

o

φγL >

1
2

φγL <

1
2

be the informedness proles under which the poor

n
= γ ∈ Γ|γL ≤

1
2φ

o

be the proles under which the

(For technical convenience, I assume that if

γL =

1
, so
2φ

that exactly half of voters are informed poor, then the informed rich remain
pivotal.) Note that, conditional upon the eective median being informed, the
income type of the eective median depends only upon
Consider

a

24

(strictly)

generalized

learning

technology

Q (g, γ)

γL .
that

increasing in each argument, and that satises

is

continuous,

Q (0, γ) = γ .

These

assumptions imply natural relationships between public goods provision and
learning. The assumption that

Q (0, γ) = γ

maintains the working assumption

that learning about the public good occurs only through acquaintance. Whilst
this is obviously an over-simplication, it allows the analysis to abstract from
other inuencing factors, and focus on the eect of acquaintance-based learning. Monotonicity implies that more learning occurs when more of the public
good is provided. Furthermore, a more informed polity will remain more informed after receiving the same amount of the public good as a less informed
polity.

Θ = {yH , yL } × {I, M } be the set of types, and let (vθ )θ∈Θ be a quadruple
2
functions, where vθ : [0, 1] → < denotes the continuation value of a type θ

Let
of

to two income types does not limit the sense in which the analysis in this section is a
generalization of the analysis in previous sections.

Indeed, in those sections  although

more income types were allowed  only two types of decision makers could exert political
power with positive probability; those with the same income as the current pivotal voter,
and those with the same income as the median income earner. Hence, the simplication to
two income types preserves (rather than restricts) the nature of the transition dynamics.

24 The monotonicity property is strict whenever
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Q (g, γ) < 1.

agent.

Proposition 3. There exists a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, and is
jointly characterized by:
1. a set of bounded value functions

(vθ∗ )θ∈Θ which

satisfy:



pg ∗ (γ)
∗
(γ) =
1−
yi + A [g ∗ (γ)]α + δv(y
(Q (g ∗ (γ) , γ))
i ,I)
y


1
pg ∗ (γ)
∗
v(yi ,M ) (γ) =
1−
yi
1−δ
y
∗
v(y
i ,I)

2. a policy function:

g ∗ (γ) =


 αA

y
p yL



1
 1−α

γ ∈ ΓL
γ ∈ ΓH

ĝ (γ)

where



pg
∗
ĝ (γ) = arg max 1 −
yH + Ag α + δv(y
(Q (g, γ))
H ,I)
g≥0
y
Proposition 3 demonstrates that there is a unique Markovian equilibrium of
the generalized learning game, characterized by the above Bellman equations.
As in the previous section, I assume that the misinformed are unaware of
the dynamics arising out of learning.

Accordingly they assume the game is

stationary  that continuation play will resemble current policy choices. Since
the poor can never lose political power (Γ

L

is an absorbing state), they will

choose their ideal policy whenever they are in power. When the rich are in
power, they face a truly dynamic decision problem, and, hence, it is the value
function of the rich that drives the results.
Let

κ (α, δ)

be the threshold from Proposition 1 in the main section.

economy is a

5-tuple e = (α, δ, yH , yL , φ)

An

which summarizes the relevant

preference and income distribution parameters. The value function depends
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upon the parameters that constitute the economy, although this dependence
is typically suppressed in the notation.

EEf f

n
o
= e ∈ E| yyHL < κ (α, δ)

Let

E

be the set of economies,

be the set of economies in which there is pos-

itive public goods provision under the simple learning technology from the

o
n
ESS = e ∈ E| yyHL > κ (α, δ) be the set of economies
in which there are slippery slope ineciencies. Consider an economy e with
initial informedness prole γ . Let Gt (γ, e) be the equilibrium public goods
provision at each time t.
previous section, and let

As the following proposition shows, slippery slope concerns arise with the
generalized learning technology whenever and only when they arise with the
simple technology:

Proposition 4. Public goods provision respects the following dynamics:
e ∈ EEf f , then Gt (γ, e) > 0 for
g (yL , I) whenever t > T (γ, e).

1. If

2. If

e ∈ ESS ,

then

Gt (γ, e) −→ 0

as

all

t

and

∃T (γ, e) ≥ 0

s.t.

Gt (γ, e) =

t → ∞.

Proposition 4 is the analogue of Proposition 1 in the previous section. It shows
that long run policy in an economy with a general learning technology is identical to the long run policy with the stark learning technology considered in
the main section. This suggests a strong robustness of the results in sections
4 and 5.1. If the economy lies in the ecient region, then there will be strictly
positive provision of the public good in the short run  although not necessarily at the ideal level of the rich, since the rich may still have an incentive to
under-provide the public (relative even to their own ideal), in order to slow the
process of learning and delay the time at which they completely cede power
to the poor. Since this time will eventually arrive, in the long run, the median
income earner's ideal policy will be eventually implemented. By contrast, if
the economy lies in the slippery slope region, then public goods provision will
very quickly disappear. Again, some public goods provision may occur in the
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short run; the rich may have some `wiggle room' to provide a small amount of
the public good without ceding power.
With additional assumptions, it can be shown the rich will never choose to
provide their ideal level of the public good when in the slippery slope regime.
Even if the rich could choose their ideal level for some periods without ceding
political power, Proposition 4 ensures that they must eventually reduce the
quantity of public goods provided by a signicant amount.

Intuitively, it

cannot be inter-temporally optimal to expect such a dramatic decrease in
public goods provision.

The rich could do better by decreasing the original

level of public goods provision, thereby slowing down the rate of learning, in
order to sustain higher average public goods provision for a longer period of
time.

This intuition is formalized in the following Lemma:

convenience , let
when

g



η (g) = 1 −

pg
ȳ



yH + Ag α

For notational

denote the stage utility of the rich

Q−1 (y, γ) be the amount
informedness prole from γ to y

units of the public good are provided, and let

of the public good that is needed to shift the
.

Lemma 4. Suppose Q is dierentiable and η (Q−1 (y, γ)) is concave. Then
Gt (γ, e) < g (yH , I) whenever e ∈ ESS .
The generalized model can explain both a status quo bias in equilibrium policy
making that entrenches ineciencies, as well as gradualism in policy making
when eciency enhancing reforms are embraced. The model predicts that the
`reform-motivated-party' (in this case, the party of the poor) will propose a
sequence of policies that eventually result in their base's ideal policy being
implemented  and that they will embrace this gradual approach even if
implementing their ideal policy is feasible in the short term.

The virtue of

the gradual approach is not merely the pragmatism of implementing the best
politically feasible outcome. Rather, it sets in motion a `domino-like' sequence
of events that systematically improves the long-run welfare of the party's base.
This eect would be even more pronounced in a more general model with a
generalized learning technology and multiple income types, since then, in every
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period, political power is shifting to agents whose preferences increasingly
aligned with those of the poor.

6.2 Partial Undervaluation of Public Good
The assumption that the misinformed do not value the public good at all is
an admittedly strong assumption.

It proved useful in keeping the analysis

tractable by ensuring that all misinformed agents demanded less of the public
goods than all informed agents.

Furthermore, it had the feature that the

misinformed would be the natural ally of a rich decision maker who sought to
prevent learning. For generic
if

AM < A,

these need not be true. For example,

AM > 0, then the misinformed would still demand a positive quantity of the

public good, opening up the possibility of a coalition between the informed
poor and the misinformed. (The informed poor have an incentive to form such
a coalition, anticipating that political power will shift in their favor as learning
occurs.)
Nevertheless, the assumption

AM = 0

is not crucial generically. Its necessity

stemmed from the interaction of two other strong assumptions of the model 
the strong monotonicity assumption that learning occurs whenever a positive
level of public goods are provided, and the assumption that a positive level of
public goods provision will be stage-game optimal whenever

At > 0.

It should

be clear that either of these assumptions could be plausibly relaxed in a more
general model. For example, one may plausibly assert that acquaintance-based
learning is improbable (or negligible) if the quantity of public good provided is
so small as to be essentially invisible to the public. Since voters are typically
not monitoring government policy very thoroughly, the policy would need to
be large enough in scale to attract the public's attention and enable them to
appropriately interact with it.
Similarly, we may plausibly assert that agents who place only a small positive
value on the benet of the public good will demand zero public goods provision.
This would be the case, for example, if the public good could only be provided
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in discrete increments. For example, if public goods provision was limited to
integer quantities, then any agent with eective income

x (yi , Ai ) >

Ay
would
p

ideally not have the public good provided at all. A similar result arises if the
public good is divisible, but there is a xed cost

C

was associated with its

provision, for example the cost of nancing the bureaucracy that oversees the
provision the public good. It is easily shown that, under these conditions, an
agent with eective income

x (yi , Ai )

will optimally demand that the public

good not be provided if:

 α
A
α
x (yi , Ai ) > (1 − α)
y=x
p
C
Either approach allows one to relax the rather strong assumption that the
misinformed completely undervalue the public, without changing the nature
of the strategic interactions involved.

7

Conclusion

Slippery slope concerns are often used in political discourse to argue against
benecial or eciency enhancing policies or reforms.

Opponents argue that

whilst the policy, taken in isolation, might be benecial, its implementation
will likely cause a sequence of further policies to be adopted, that results in a
nal outcome that is worse than the status quo. What rationalizes this fear
of reform momentum that causes policy to overshoot its target? Why doesn't
the polity simply reject the subsequent reforms, if they really are suboptimal?
This paper rationalizes slippery slope concerns as a consequence of decision
making in a democracy, where some voters are originally misinformed about
the value of a policy or reform, but may come to learn its value through acquaintance. For concreteness, I focused on the provision of a public good that
has an objective marginal benet, but whose value some voters under-estimate.
Since they are liable to nance a greater share of the public good, richer voters demand less of the good than the poor. Moreover, at each income level,
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misinformed voters demand less of the good than a correctly informed voter
would.

Lower than optimal demand by the misinformed results in political

power being held by agents whose incomes are larger than the true median
income. Through acquaintance with the good, the misinformed come to learn
of its true value. Hence, if the optimal level of the public good is provided,
through time, political power will shift to agents with incomes closer to the
true median, who prefer a larger provision of the public good. This creates
an incentive for the current (relatively rich) decision maker to not provide the
public good, to prevent learning and thereby retain political control of the
agenda.
This paper's main result is that slippery slope ineciencies are most likely
to arise in polities where the income (or more generally preferences) of the
current and future decision makers are suciently disparate. Importantly, I
show that the incentive to distort policy to prevent learning may exist even if
the number of misinformed agents is relatively small and large majorities of
agents are informed. The relationship between income disparity the likelihood
of slippery slope ineciencies arising suggests a connection to the amount of
income inequality in the polity.

I introduce a measure of inequality that is

distinct from, but analogous to, Lorenz dominance, and show that increasing
inequality increases the likelihood that slippery slope ineciencies will arise.
This result is in contrast to standard models in which rising inequality causes
the demand for public goods to rise.

Hence, the analysis suggest a novel

mechanism by which inequality can generate Pareto inecient outcomes.
I also studied the relationship between the informedness of agents at dierent
levels of the income prole and slippery slope ineciencies. Taking the case of
uniform informedness as a `judgment-free' baseline, I demonstrated that slippery slope ineciencies are more likely to arise when the poor are relatively
less informed than the rich (holding the total number of informed agents constant).

This invites the interpretation that the informed rich dupe the less

informed poor into voting against their interests.

However, I show that the

same ineciency can arise if almost all below-median income earners are correctly informed, but many `middle-class' voters are misinformed. Although the
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misinformed poor contribute to the existence of slippery slope ineciencies,
culpability for these ineciencies does not lie solely on their shoulders.
Although the analysis focused on the case of public goods provision, the mechanism can be applied more broadly.

The motivating example of same-sex

marriage can be mapped into the model by considering the (reasonably) objective benets (including favorable tax treatment, legal and societal rights
and recognitions, such as visitation rights at hospitals, etc.) of extending marriage rights to same-sex couples on the one hand, against the personal costs
that individuals may suer from changing the structure of institutions that
they may be more or less invested in (perhaps for spiritual reasons). In this
context, there is an incentive for conservative voters (for whom the personal
ideological costs are large) to obscure the many legal and nancial benets
that marriage aords same-sex couples, which, if made explicit, would cause
more liberal voters to support same-sex marriage. In this context, the analogue of greater income inequality is greater political polarization, and it is
clear to see that slippery slope ineciencies will be much more likely to arise
in more polarized societies.
This analysis focused on learning by acquaintance, and thereby abstracted
from the many varied sources of information through which agents may learn
about the value of policies and reforms.

The purpose was to demonstrate

that political actors have strong incentives to distort policy choices in order to
prevent learning. In a broader context, one can think of additional resources,
such as the media, that political actors can bring to bear to skew the learning
of voters. Given the proliferation of media sources with the internet and cable
television, the rise of a partisan media, and the increasing tendency of voters to
consciously select their news sources, this suggests fruitful avenues for further
research.
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Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1.

(1)

u(xm (γ),I) (g (xm (γ) , I)).


 α
xm (γ) 1−α
δ 1 − α yxm
.
ym
∗
u(x,I) (g (xm (γ) , I)) i
H (xm (γ1 ) ; xm (γ1 )) < 0.

Take
Let
It

x > xm .
H (x; xm (γ))

follows

H (x; xm (γ1 )) < 0

=

algebraically

H (x; xm (γ1 ))

<

that

0.

u(x,I) (g = 0)
By

>

assumption

Moreover:

(1 − δ) α δα
∂H
=−
−
∂x
xm (γ)
ym
Hence,

u(xm(γ),I) (g = 0) >
(1 − δ) 1 − α xmx(γ) +

Suppose

for all



xm (γ)
ym

α
 1−α

<0

x > xm (γ).

(2) Proved analogously

Proof of Proposition 1 .

1
, we know that
2

xm (γ) < ∞. We know
that a type (y, I) proposer prefers her ideal public good level if H (y, y) > 0
and no public goods otherwise. Let h (k) = H (kym , kym ). Since h (k) =

α
(1 − δ) (1 − α) + δ (1 − αk) (k) 1−α , it is straight-forward to show that, h α1 =
(1 − δ) (1 − α) > 0 and limk→∞ h (x) < 0. Hence, by the intermediate value

∂h
1
,
∞
s.t. h (κ) = 0. Moreover, since
=
theorem, there exists some κ ∈
α
∂k
α
−1
α
1
δ 1−α (k) 1−α (1 − k) < 0 whenever k > α , κ is unique, and h (k) > 0 i k < κ.
Since

γ>

The comparative statics follow by the implicit function theorem:
1

∂κ
=−
∂α

(1 − δ) + δ (κ) 1−α +

δ
(ακ
(1−α)2
α
−1
1−α

α
δ 1−α
(κ)

and

α

− 1) (κ) 1−α ln (κ)
<0

(κ − 1)
α

∂κ
− (1 − α) + (1 − ακ) (κ) 1−α
=
<0
α
α 1
∂δ
δ 1−α
(κ) 1−α −1 (κ − 1)
ym

Proof of Proposition 2.
let

yi = ym (Fi ).

Let

xi = xm (γ, Fi ) and
of Fi . Consider the

For notational simplicity, let

fi (y) =

Fi0

(y)
43

be the density

transformed random variable

h

Yi
, and let
yi

F̂i be its distribution function.

Clearly

i

≤ z = Fi (yi z). Then fˆi (z) = yi fi (yi z).
Rx
Let I (x, F ) =
γ (y|F ) f (y) dy be the number of informed people with
0
income below x, given income prole F and informedness prole γ . Note
−1
that for any other income prole G, G (y) = F (F
(G (y))) and so g (y) =
d
F −1 (G (y)). Hence:
f (F −1 (G (y))) dy
F̂i (z) = Pr

Yi
yi

Z

x

γ (y|G) g (y) dy

I (x, G) =
0

Z

x


 d −1
γ F −1 (G (y)) |F f F −1 (G (y))
F (G (y)) dy
dy

=
0

Z

F −1 (G(x))

γ (z|F ) f (z) dz

= I F −1 (G (x)) , F

=

0

where the second line follows from the income-rank independence of
the third line involves a change of variable.

I (xm (γ, F ) , F ) =

I

x
, F̂i
yi







and so

I F̂i−1 F̂j

 
xi
xj

and

Note also by construction that

1
.
2

I (x, Fi ) = I

Using the above property, note that:



γ,

I



xi
, F̂i
yi





=

1
.
2



Using the property

F̂i−1



(Fi (x)) , F̂i =


xi
again, I
,
F̂
=
j
yi

I (·, F ) is strictly increasing in its


  

−1
x1
x2
x1
x1
1
rst argument. Hence
≤ y2 i 2 = I y1 , F̂1 ≥ I F̂1 F̂2 y1
, F̂1 =
y1


 
  
x1
I xy11 , F̂2 . This will be true i xy11 ≥ F̂1−1 F̂2 xy11
or equivalentlyF̂1
≥

 y1
 
F̂2 xy11 . Finally, since F̂i (z) = F̄i (zyi ), we have F1 (x1 ) ≥ F2 x1 yy21 .
, F̂i

. Finally, note that



Proof of Lemma 2.

xm (γ|Fi )
ym (F1 )

≥ 1. Since F2 is a mediannormalized spread of F1 , then F2 (zym (F2 )) ≤ F1 (zym (F1 )) for z > 1. Taking


ym (F2 )
1)
z = xymm(γ,F
, we have F2 xm (γ, F )
≤ F1 (xm (γ, F1 )). A direct appli(F1 )
ym (F1 )
Obviously

cation of Proposition 2 completes the proof.

Proof of Lemma 3 .
Yi ,

let

Fi

and

Li

Let

Y1

and

Y2

be two income proles. For each prole

be the associated distribution and Lorenz functions, and let

44

ȳ (Fi )

ym (Fi ) be the associated mean and median incomes. Furthermore,
1
Y and let F̄i and L̄i be the associated distribution and
for each i, let Ȳi =
ȳ(Fi ) i

Lorenz functions. Clearly F̄i (z) = Fi (ȳ (Fi ) · z), and ȳ F̄i = 1. Furthermore,
by the scale-invariance property of Lorenz functions, L̄i (p) = Li (p).
and

Y1 Lorenz dominates Y2 only if F̄2 (y) second order stochastically dominates F̄1 (y). Recall,
R F −1 (p)
1
ydF (y). Hence:
the Lorenz function is dened by: L (p) =
E[Y ] 0

First, using a variant of the proof in Thistle (1989), I show that

Li (p) = L̄i (p)
Z F̄i−1 (p)
ydF̄i (y)
=
0

=

pF̄i−1

F̄i−1 (p)

Z
(p) −

F̄i (y) dy
0

where the third line uses integration by parts. Let

S̄i (x) =

Rx
0

F̄i (y) dy .





L1 (p) − L2 (p) = p F̄1−1 (p) − F̄2−1 (p) − S̄1 F̄1−1 (p) − S̄2 F̄2−1 (p)




= p F̄1−1 (p) − F̄2−1 (p) − S̄1 F̄1−1 (p) − S̄1 F̄2−1 (p)


+ S̄2 F̄2−1 (p) − S̄1 F̄2−1 (p)
Z F̄2−1 (p)




=
F̄1 (y) − p dy + S̄2 F̄2−1 (p) − S̄1 F̄2−1 (p)
F̄1−1 (p)

Since

F̄2

is a mean-preserving spread of

F̄1 , the second term (in parentheses) is

non-negative, by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). So is the rst term. Suppose



F̄1−1 (p) ≤ F̄2−1 (p). Then F̄1 (y) − p ≥ 0 for y ∈ F̄1−1 (p) , F̄2−1 (p) . Else,
 −1

−1
−1
−1
suppose F̄1 (p) ≥ F̄2 (p). Then F̄1 (y) − p ≤ 0 for y ∈ F̄2 (p) , F̄1 (p) . In
either case, the rst term is positive. Hence L1 (p) ≥ L2 (p).
Second, using a variant of the proof in Malamud and Trojani (2009), I show
that if

F2

is a median-normalized spread of

Let

and satises the single-crossing

F̄2 second order stochastically dominates F̄1 . It suces to show
S̄2 (x) − S̄1 (x) ≥ 0 for every x.

Rz
ȳ(F2 )
ȳ(F1 )
≥
.
Then S̄2 (z) − S̄1 (z) =
F̄
(y)
−
F̄
(y)
dy =
2
1
ym (F2 )
ym (F1 )
0

property, then,
that

F1
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Rz

(F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · y) − F1 (ȳ (F2 ) · y)) dy .
Since F2 is a median-normalized
spread of F1 , F2 (ym (F2 ) · z) ≥ F1 (ym (F1 ) · z) whenever z ≤ 1.
Hence


ȳ(F1 )
ym (F1 )
F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · y) ≥ F2 ym (F1 ) y · ym (F2 ) ≥ F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · y) whenever y ≤ ȳ(F1 ) .
Hence S̄2 (z) − S̄1 (z) ≥ 0 for z ≤ ym (F1 ).
0

By the single-crossing property, we know that there is a single

z

for which

F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · z) and F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · z) cross. Hence if F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · z) < F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · z)
for some z , then F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · y) < F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · y) for all y > z . This implies
that S̄2 (z) − S̄1 (z) is decreasing for z above the crossing point. Now, take
limz→∞ S̄2 (z) − S̄1 (z). Integrating by parts gives:
Z

∞

y (dF2 (ȳ (F2 ) · y) − dF1 (ȳ (F1 ) · y))
lim y [F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · y) − F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · y)] −
0
Z ∞
Z ∞
1
1
wdF2 (w) +
wdF1 (w)
= −
ȳ (F2 ) 0
ȳ (F1 ) 0
= 0
z→∞

S̄2 (z) − S̄1 (z) ≥ 0 for all z , and
dominates F̄2 . This completes the proof.
Hence

Proof of Corollary 1.
ȳ(F2 )
suppose
ym (F2 )

=

Let

ȳ(F1 )
.
ym (F1 )

Y2

so

F̄1

second order stochastically

Y1
· ym (F2 ) .

be a median-normalized spread of



ȳ(F1 )
z
ym (F1 )

and

F2 (ȳ (F2 ) z) = F2
By



ȳ(F1 )
ȳ(F1 )
median-normalized spreads, F2
z
·
y
(F
)
≥
F
z
·
y
(F
)
m
2
1
m
1
 ym (F1 )

 ym (F1 )

ȳ(F1 )
ȳ(F1 )
ȳ(F1 )
whenever
z < 1, and F2 ym (F1 ) z · ym (F2 ) ≤ F1 ym (F1 ) z · ym (F1 ) =
ym (F1 )
Then



1)
F1 (ȳ (F1 ) · z) whenever yȳ(F
z ≥ 1. Hence F2 (ȳ (F2 ) z) ≥ F1 (ȳ (F1 ) z)
m (F1 )
ym (F1 )
ym (F1 )
whenever z <
and F2 (ȳ (F2 ) z) ≤ F1 (ȳ (F1 ) z) whenever z ≥
.
ȳ(F1 )
ȳ(F1 )
1
∗
Since F2 (ȳ (F2 ) · z ) =
= F (ȳ (F1 ) · z ∗ ), there is a single-crossing at
2
m (F1 )
z ∗ = yȳ(F
.Hence, by Lemma 3, median-normalization implies Lorenz domi1)

nance.

Proof of Proposition 3.
L

Q (g, γ) ∈ Γ

Suppose

γ

Then,

g ≥ 0, and so the poor will be
choice of g . Since the dynamics of

for any

regardless of their

∈ ΓL .

by

monotonicity,

pivotal in every period,
the game arise only out

of potentially changing identity of the eective median (as learning occurs),
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the game strategically collapses to one in which the poor implement their ideal
stage policy in every period. Hence, for any
so:

vθ∗
Now, take
income

γ∈Γ

,

∗

g (γ) =



αA y
p yL

1
 1−α

and

"


 α #
1
yt
αA y 1−α
(γ) =
yt + At − αA
1−δ
yL
p yL

γ ∈ ΓH .

yH .

L

This implies that the pivotal voter is informed and has

(To see this, note that, by construction, a coalition between the

informed rich and either the informed poor or the misinformed will command

(τ, g) ≤ (τ 0 , g 0 ) with g 0 ≤ g (yL , I),
(τ 0 , g 0 ) and the informed poor always

a majority. For any two feasible policies
the misinformed always prefer
prefer

0

0

(τ , g )

to

(τ, g).

(τ, g)

to

Hence, the preference of the informed rich over these

policies will be decisive.)
Let

F

be the set of bounded functions on

Γ.

Dene the operator:

T :F →F

by



o
n
α

maxg≥0 1 − pg
y
+
Ag
+
δv
(Q
(g,
γ))
H
y


α


 1−α
T [v] (γ) =
y
y
1
αA

 1−δ yH + A 1 − α yL
p yL

γ ∈ ΓH
γ ∈ ΓL



pg
Since v is bounded and 1 −
yH +Ag α has an upper bound (that is achieved
y
1

 1−α
αA y
when g =
), it must be that T [v] is bounded.
p yH
I show that

T [v]

is a contraction mapping. It suces to show that

Blackwell's conditions. Take

L

γ∈Γ

,

T [v] (γ) = T [w] [γ].

v, w ∈ F

and suppose

Suppose

H

γ∈Γ
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and

T

satises

v (γ) ≥ w (γ) for all γ . For
let gv (γ) and gw (γ) be the

optimal policy functions, given

v

and

w,

respectively. Then:




pgv (γ)
1−
yH + A (gv (γ))α + δv (Q (gv (γ) , γ))
y


pgw (γ)
yH + A (gw (γ))α + δv (Q (gw (γ) , γ))
1−
y


pgw (γ)
1−
yH + A (gw (γ))α + δw (Q (gw (γ) , γ))
y
T [w] [γ]

T [v] (γ) =
≥
≥
=

T [v] (γ) ≥ T [w] [γ], which demonstrates
γ ∈ Γ , T [v + c] (γ) = T [v] (γ) and:
Hence

monotonicity.

Similarly, for

L



pg
α
T [v + c] (γ) = max
yH + Ag + δ (v (Q (g, γ)) + c)
1−
g≥0
y



pg
α
yH + Ag + δv (Q (g, γ)) + δc
= max
1−
g≥0
y
= T [v] (γ) + δc


Hence

T [v + c](γ) ≤ T [v] (γ) + δc,

which veries discounting. Hence,

contraction mapping and so it contains a unique xed point
In fact, this xed point is the value function for a
that, when

γ ∈ ΓH ,

T

is a

∗

v (γ) ∈ F .

(yH , I)-type agent.

It follows

the policy is given by:



pg
g (γ) = arg max 1 −
yH + Ag α + δv ∗ (Q (g, γ))
g≥0
y
∗

and the value functions for the remaining types (over the region

γ ∈ ΓH )

are

dened as in the statement of the proposition.

Proof
of

 Proposition 4.
1−

pg
y

yH + Ag

α

For

notational

convenience,

let

∗
. If the rich choose their desired stage policy gH

η (g)
=
= g (yH , I)

and immediately surrender political power to the poor, they will receive payo

δ
∗
η (gL∗ ), where gL∗ = g (yH , I) is the ideal
v̄ = η (gH
) + 1−δ
∗
Recall η is a concave function that is maximized at gH ,
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policy of the poor.
and that

∗
gL∗ > gH
.

e ∈ EEf f ,

By construction, if

then

v̄ >

1
η
1−δ

(0),

whilst the opposite is true if

e ∈ ESS .
χt (γ, e) as the equilibrium informedness prole after t periods.
I.e.
χ1 (γ, e) = Q (g ∗ (γ) , γ), and χk (γ, e) =


Q g ∗ χk−1 (γ, e) , χk−1 (γ, e) for each k ≥ 2. Similarly, dene Gt (γ, e) as
t
the equilibrium level of public goods provision at time t. Clearly G (γ, e) =
g ∗ (χt (γ, e)).
For

each

γ,

dene

e ∈ ESS

First I show that
poor.

implies that the rich should never concede to the

Suppose there is an equilibrium in which the rich concede power to

the poor.

χt̂−1
L

Let

t̂

be the rst period in which the poor are in power.

1
<
2φ

(γ, e) ≤

t̂−1
+
utility η G

χt̂L

(γ, e).

δ
η
1−δ

At

(gL∗ ).

t = t̂ − 1,

But since

choosing

e ∈ ESS ,

t̂−1

G

1
η
1−δ

(γ, e)

Hence

gives the rich

 
(0) > v̄ ≥ η Gt̂ +

(gL∗ ). This implies that there is a favorable deviation for the rich to oer
g = 0 at every t ≥ t̂ − 1, and so the rich should not concede power at t̂. But
δ
η
1−δ

this implies there is no rst period when it is optimal for the rich to concede
power.

e ∈ ESS implies Gt (γ, e) → 0 for every γ ∈ ΓH . Suppose
t
t
not. Then for some ε > 0, there exists a sub-sequence {G k } of {G }, such that

∞
Gtk ≥ ε for each k . Dene the sequence χ̃k k=0 , where χ̃0 (γ, e) = γ and for

k
t
k−1
every k ≥ 1, χ̃ (γ, e) = Q G k , χ̃
(γ, e) . This is the sequence of informedt
t
ness proles that would arise by replacing G = 0 whenever G < ε. By monot
k
tonicity, χ k (γ) ≥ χ̃ (γ). Since Q is continuous in g , there exists ρ (ε, γ) > 0
s.t. Q (g, γ) − Q (0, γ) > ρ (ε, γ) whenever g > ε. Moreover, ρ is continuous in
γ (since Q is continuous in γ ). Since ΓH is compact, ρ (ε, γ) achieves its lower
H
bound on Γ . Let ρ (ε) = minγ∈ΓH ρ (ε, γ). Clearly ρ (ε) > 0. Hence, for each


k , χ̃k (γ, e) − χ̃k−1 (γ, e) ≥ Q ε, χ̃k−1 (γ, e) − Q 0, χ̃k−1 (γ, e) > ρ (ε) > 0 
k
k−1
i.e. χ̃ (γ) > χ̃
(γ)+ρ (ε) for every k ≥ 1. By induction, χ̃k (γ) > kρ (ε)+γ .
Next, I show that

1

−γL

1
k
k > 2φρ(ε) = K (ε) , χteL
(γ) ≥ χ̃keL (γ) > 2φ
 i.e. for t ≥ tK(ε) ,
tk
L
χe (γ) ∈ Γ ; the rich will eventually surrender political power to the poor.
Then, for

But this cannot be.
Next, consider an economy

e ∈ EEf f .
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This implies

∗
η (0) < η (gL∗ ) < η (gH
)

and so there exists

∗
ĝ ∈ (0, gH
)

such that

1
η
1−δ

∗
(ĝ) = η (gH
)+

The rich would rather concede power to the poor (and receive
receive

ĝ

(or fewer) public goods forever into the future.

show that

e ∈ EEf f

Using this fact, I

T (γ, ε) < ∞ at which the rich
1
t
.
Then, for every t ≥ 1, χ (γ, e) ≤
2φ

implies the there exist

concede power to the poor. Suppose not.
This requires that

(gL∗ ) = v̄ .
utility v̄ ) than
δ
η
1−δ

Gt (γ, e) → 0.

(If not, using the same argument as in the

previous paragraph, we can nd a sub-sequence that is bounded above zero
that guarantees that power shifts within a nite number periods.) Convergence

Gt (γ, e) < ĝ whenever t > T̂ (ĝ).
Clearly, this policy path cannot be optimal from time T̂ (ĝ) onwards  the rich
would be better o surrendering power to the poor at t = T̂ (ĝ) (or sooner).
1
t
Hence, (by monotonicity) there must exist some T (γ, e) s.t. χ (γ, e) >
for
2φ
every t > T (γ, e).
to zero implies that there is some

Proof of Lemma 4 .

Suppose

T̂ (ĝ)

s.t.

e ∈ ESS .

Suppose the objective function in

the agent's maximization problem is dierentiable and concave, and so the rst
order conditions are sucient for the maximum. By the rst order conditions:

η 0 (Q−1 (y ∗ , γ))
+ δv 0 (y ∗ ) = 0
Qg (Q−1 (y ∗ , γ))
By the envelope theorem:

 Qγ (Q−1 (y ∗ , γ) , γ)
v 0 (γ) = −η 0 Q−1 (y ∗ , γ)
Qg (Q−1 (y ∗ , γ) , γ)
Hence, the Euler equation is:

η 0 (g ∗ (γ))

1
Qγ (g ∗ (y ∗ (γ)) , y ∗ (γ))
0
∗
∗
=
δη
(g
(y
(γ)))
Qg (g ∗ , γ)
Qg (g ∗ (y ∗ (γ)) , y ∗ (γ))

y ∗ (γ) = Q (g ∗ (γ) , γ). Since Qg > 0 and Qγ > 0, this implies that if
η 0 (Gt (γ, e)) = 0 for some t, then η 0 (Gt0 (γ, e)) = 0 for all t0 > t. If Gt (γ, e) =
∗
gH
for some t, then it must remain at that level indenitely. This is impossible,
∗
since Gt → 0. Hence, Gt (γ, e) < gH for all t.
where
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I am left to show that the objective function is indeed concave and dierentiable. Since the rich never concede political power, the value function satises:

v ∗ (γ) = max




η Q−1 (y, γ) + δv ∗ (y)

y∈[0,ȳ(γ)]
where

ȳ (γ) = limg→∞ [Q (g, γ)].
v∗

ΓH .

FC be the space of bounded concave
functions. It suces to show that T : FC → FC . Let v be a concave function.
H
0
∗
0
Let γ, γ ∈ Γ
and let γλ = λγ + (1 − λ) γ . Denote y = Q (g (γ) , γ), y =
Q (g ∗ (γ 0 ) , γ 0 ) and yλ = Q (g ∗ (γλ ) , γλ ). Then
I show that

is concave on

Let


T [v] (γλ ) = η Q−1 (yλ , γλ ) + δv (yλ )

≥ η Q−1 (λy + (1 − λ) y 0 , λγ + (1 − λ) γ 0 ) + δv (λy + (1 − λ) y 0 )


≥ λη Q−1 (y, γ) + (1 − λ) η Q−1 (y 0 , γ 0 ) + δ [λv (y) + (1 − λ) v (y 0 )]
= λT [v] (γ) + (1 − λ) T [v] (γ 0 )
where the second line uses the joint concavity of
point

v

∗

η (Q−1 (y, γ)).

Hence the xed

is concave.

∗
H
v is dierentiable everywhere in the interior of Γ . Take any
1
1
∗
∗
and let y0 = Q (g (γ0 ) , γ0 ). For γ in the neighborhood of
γ 0 ∈ 1 − 2φ
, 2φ
γ0 , let ψ (γ) = η (Q−1 (y0∗ , γ))+δv ∗ (y0∗ ). By the optimality of v ∗ , v ∗ (γ) ≥ ψ (γ)
∗
and by construction ψ (γ0 ) = v (γ0 ). Moreover, ψ (γ) is dierentiable in γ ,
since η and Q are dierentiable. Hence, by Theorem 1 in Benveniste and
∗
Scheinkman (1979), v is dierentiable at γ0 . Since γ0 was chosen arbitrarily,
∗
H
then v is dierentiable everywhere in the interior of Γ .

Next, I show that
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